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The Impact of Social Media and Digital Technology on Electoral Violence 
in Kenya 
Patrick Mutahi and Brian Kimari 
 
Summary 
 
Electoral violence has become synonymous with Kenya’s elections. This acquired deadly 
proportions during the 2007 elections. However, it was also during this time that social media 
and digital technology were first used for political reasons, including for campaigning and 
polling. Social media and digital technology had mixed uses where they were not only used 
to propagate hate speech and mobilise for violence, but also to identify and map out violence 
hotspots. Since then, they have increasingly become an indispensable tool in Kenya’s 
politics and governance, used by political leaders to spread information, campaign and 
mobilise. However, the widespread reach of social media has also been a major challenge to 
security, peace and peacebuilding since it has been used to incite hatred and violence. This 
paper identifies the specific threats that social media and digital technology pose and 
opportunities they present for violence prevention. Ultimately, the paper seeks to present the 
opportunities that exist for partnerships between state and non-state actors to effectively 
prevent political and electoral violence.  
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Summary 
 
Social media has increasingly become an indispensable tool in Kenya’s political spaces. Its 
wide reach has rendered it an asset to political leaders who use it to spread information, to 
campaign, and to mobilise supporters during election cycles. However, the use of social 
media has presented a dilemma for conflict prevention and peacebuilding. It was used to 
incite hatred and violence during the 2007 elections where hateful and incendiary messages 
were circulated through popular social media platforms, leading to calls for regulation to 
stem the spread of hate speech. The same trend is being recorded as the country prepares 
for 2017 elections. On the other hand, it is also used to provide counter-messaging and 
promote peace messages. 
 
Social media and digital technologies as used by Kenyan citizens and leaders, thus poses a 
threat to stability but also presents opportunities for peacebuilding. This study seeks to 
identify some of the opportunities and limitations of social media and other digital platforms 
on the political landscape, especially how they are used to mobilise, monitor, respond to and 
prevent violence, as well as their usage in peacebuilding.  
 
Undoubtedly, the 2007 presidential elections saw the dissemination of hateful and divisive 
language through the media. However, these elections were particularly unique from those 
before, owing to the use of new media forms in addition to the traditional media. This 
included the popular use of phone technology through SMS text messages sent en masse 
and the use of internet technology, especially email, blogs, and social networking platforms. 
Numerous reports indicated the role played by new media in inflaming and spreading hate 
speech leading up to the violence (Bayne 2008; European Union 2008; KNCHR 2008; 
Njoroge et al. 2011).  
 
On the other hand, peace actors used the same platforms to call and campaign for peace, a 
feat that was replicated during the 2013 elections. Television broadcasters went on social 
media such as Twitter and Facebook to spread positive messages and encourage viewers to 
remain calm and patient as the election results were announced. It was during this election 
that social media also became a visible component of campaigning as candidates seized on 
its potential to mobilise supporters. In 2017, political actors across the spectrum have utilised 
social media platforms to mobilise supporters and even hired people to manage their social 
media accounts. The same peace messaging deployed in 2013 has been replicated five 
years later, using the social media, SMS text messages and various internet platforms. 
 
Social media presents an opportunity to report and document election-related violence. 
Online monitoring through crowd-sourcing enables the identification of appropriate 
technologies and tools to track and analyse structural tensions, social divides and friction 
points. Using SMS, Kenyans have been able to report, map and document violent incidents 
on a mass scale, providing information which journalists could not ordinarily access using 
traditional means. Facebook has allowed users to share experiences and witness accounts 
of elections, while other sites have permitted the uploading and sharing of videos showing 
violence and thus enabling the mapping of violence and generating public attention which 
would facilitate prevention efforts as well as responses by government and other actors.  
 
It is important to note that social media does not actually cause the violence but is simply a 
tool to inflame and exploit existing divisions. Digital technology and social media platforms 
are employed to not only provoke emotions, but also spread false information or so-called 
‘fake news’. Despite existing laws on hate speech and the existence of the National 
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Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC),1 there have been few convictions. Another 
challenge has been the lack of necessary tools and skills to monitor and detect online 
activity which makes it difficult for government and non-state actors to respond to activity 
that may lead to or propel violence. This is especially problematic due to an abundance of 
platforms on which information is shared faster than before and to a wider audience. To 
politicians, these tools have nevertheless enabled them reach audiences at a lower cost 
compared to that required for on-the-ground mobilisation.  
 
However, the online space remains a marketplace of ideas, which contributes to 
development and requires protection from unnecessary interference and irresponsible users 
especially through self-regulation and moderation by site managers and users. This will 
guarantee users their rights to freedom of expression. The protection of these rights and 
freedoms, however, also requires the limitation of hate speech because hateful comments 
hijack legitimate public debate. 
 
The paper concludes with the following recommendations: 
 
 State and non-state actors need to enhance coordination and linkages in initiatives 
using technology and social media to curb electoral violence, including closely working 
with stakeholders’ peace forums at the county and community levels; 
 Policymakers should consider other measures including self-regulation and co-
regulation that may complement the limited existing legislative and judicial 
mechanisms for regulating online activity that could lead to incitement and violence; 
 Internet service providers, telephone companies and the state should carry out public 
information and education campaigns as part of interventions to curb online hatred. 
Education can increase the responsibility of individual users and thereby promote a 
culture of intolerance towards online hate. When people are informed, they can report 
abuse and also name and shame violators; 
 Any efforts by the government to deal with online hate crimes should be guided by the 
Constitution and should not be used as a license to violate other individual rights and 
freedoms especially; 
 There is a need for continuous training of law enforcement officers so that they can 
investigate and prosecute, where necessary, hate crimes more effectively especially in 
a context of rapidly changing and spreading use of new technologies. 
 
  
                                                 
1  The NCIC is a statutory body established under the National Cohesion and Integration Act (Act No.12 of 2008). It seeks 
to promote national unity in Kenya and facilitates processes and policies that encourage elimination of all forms of 
ethnic discrimination irrespective of background, social circle, race and ideological belief(s). 
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1 Introduction 
The outbreak of widespread violence following Kenya’s disputed 2007 elections thrust non-
state actors into the limelight of the discourses on violence in Kenya. Though still organised 
and carried out in the same manner as previous cycles of electoral violence, in this round, 
social media and digital technologies were used for perpetrating violence (CIPEV 2008).  
 
The report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV)2 established 
that the 2007/08 violence was partly due to the spread of hate speech witnessed in the run 
up to the election (CIPEV 2008). According to the Kenya National Commission on Human 
Rights (KNCHR),  
 
The entire electioneering period was characterised by hate speech and incitement to 
violence… One thing that is memorable about the 2007 elections is the role played by 
all manner of information from all manner of sources, unsolicited and solicited – SMS, 
blogs, emails, newsletter, leaflets, not to mention the newspapers, TV and radio 
sources. (KNCHR 2008) 
 
Social media and digital technology have thus been a conduit, rather than a cause, of the 
violence. They have been used as tools to incite and organise the violence.  
 
The growing significance of ethnic hatred and incitement through the internet and social 
media in Kenya is largely due to the rapid spread of mobile phone and internet usage in the 
country over the past 15 years. According to the Communications Authority of Kenya (CA), 
the estimated number of internet users currently stands at 40.5 million whereas mobile 
subscriptions stand at 39.1 million (CA 2017: 5, 23).3 Mobile and internet-based platforms 
that are widely used include WhatsApp, Facebook and Twitter among others. WhatsApp 
reportedly has 10 million users in Kenya, whereas according to Facebook, its users in Kenya 
add up to about 6.1 million (BAKE 2016). Twitter is one of the most widespread and 
commonly used social media tools in Kenya, with an estimated 2.2 million monthly active 
users (BAKE 2016). Other popular online platforms in Kenya include Instagram, and 
LinkedIn, with estimates of 3 million and 1.5 million users in Kenya respectively (BAKE 
2016). 
 
Digital technology as used in this paper represents technology that relies on the use of 
microprocessors; this includes computers and applications that are dependent on computers 
such as the internet, as well as other devices such as video cameras, and mobile devices 
such as phones and personal-digital assistants (PDAs) (Pullen et al. 2009). The focus of this 
paper shall largely be on mobile technology and mobile-based applications.  
 
Social media, on the other hand, refers to modern forms of online media that facilitate 
participation, encourage contributions and feedback, openness in conversation and 
facilitates the sharing of information (iCrossing 2017).4 Social media encompasses a range 
                                                 
2  This was an international commission of inquiry established by the Government of Kenya in February 2008 to 
investigate the clashes in Kenya following the disputed Kenyan presidential election of 2007. Its specific mandate was 
to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the violence, the conduct of state security agencies in their 
handling of it, and to make recommendations concerning these and other matters. 
3  These figures reflect the estimated number of active users and subscriptions within 90 days from January to March 
2017. According to CA, they use the International Telecommunication Union recommended formula for estimating the 
number of internet users in the country (CA 2017: 24). 
4  We note, however, the contestation and lack of universally recognised definition of social media. While there tends to 
be general consensus on what tools may be considered social media, i.e. popular platforms like Facebook and Twitter, 
there is no agreement on what defines these tools as social media. It is however beyond the scope of this paper to 
dwell on these contestations. For further discussions on definitions, see O’Reilly (2005), Mandiberg (2012), Boyd and 
Ellison (2008), Xiang and Gretzel (2010), Kaplan and Haenlin (2010), Effing et al. (2011), Howard and Parks (2012), 
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of information and communication technologies used for sharing information and opinions, 
often through the creation of explicit connection with other people or groups (Toivo 2012). 
This includes interactive websites that use ‘Web 2.0 techniques’; blogs that allow reporting 
and commenting; social networking services (SNS) such as Facebook; microblogging 
services such as Twitter allowing instant publication of short messages; and photo and video 
sharing services such as Instagram that allow users to publish material they have produced 
(Davies 2014). This means that social media allows not only for the generation of content by 
its users but also for its dissemination in a peer-to-peer manner, thus allowing participation 
on the networking site where other users can discuss shared content (Comninos 2013: 7).  
 
Increase in internet and mobile penetration has correspondingly led to the growth of social 
media and use of digital technologies which has had an influence on Kenya’s electoral and 
political violence landscapes and this is worth exploring.  
 
Firstly, they have provided alternative avenues for politicians to campaign and mobilise their 
supporters, reaching most of them at little cost, compared to on-the-ground mobilisation. As 
Borah observes, social media has become a visible component of political campaigning 
owing to the recognition by political leaders of the potential that social media has to mobilise 
supporters (Borah 2014: 201). In a context of political devolution, social media and 
smartphones ‘have “liberated” and emancipated mediated communication from the centre 
(state and institutions) and given more agency to ordinary individuals insofar as political 
debate and action is concerned.’ (Omanga 2017) Individuals can easily inspire and 
coordinate collective action outside of a formal hierarchy at low costs if they have the right 
social networking tools and have an active audience (Bott et al. 2014: 109). The same 
advantages can and have been used for destabilisation purposes, as this paper explores. 
More than before, it is easy and quick to incite and mobilise for violence, whilst spreading 
inflammatory and hateful speech5 to a much wider audience through mobile, online and 
digital technologies (Benesch 2014; iHub 2013). In the 2007 and 2013 elections, social 
media and mobile technology were observed as conduits for spreading polarising content 
usually along ethnic lines (iHub 2013).  
 
Secondly, the organising, mobilising, and financing, both for and against violence now relies 
on the use of digital and social media platforms. Social media and digital technologies offer 
many different platforms where the same message can be shared across different platforms 
at the same time – Facebook, Twitter, blogs or Instagram. While this is a good thing for 
peace messaging, it can also be used to rapidly organise for violence purposes.  
 
Thirdly, the use of social media and digital technology to organise and mobilise violence 
presents a challenge for security management. While developments in digital technology 
such as online tracking may enhance the capacity of authorities to prevent violence, it is 
difficult for state and non-state actors to monitor and detect online activity that leads to or 
propels violence if they should lack the necessary tools and technical know-how. Technology 
keeps changing and becomes harder to penetrate, for example due to encryption. Privacy 
concerns also make it difficult for the authorities to intercept conversations without 
authorisation.  
 
This paper examines how mobile phones, social media, crowdsourcing, crisis mapping, 
blogging, and big data analytics have been used to mobilise, counter, document and 
forecast political and electoral violence in Kenya. It identifies the specific threats that social 
media poses to peace and stability as well as the opportunities offered for peacebuilding in 
Kenya. It starts with tracing the growth of social media and digital technologies in Kenya, 
                                                 
Carr and Hayes (2015), Scott and Jacka (2011), Zhoe et al. (2008), Benkler (2006), and Wunsch-Vincent and Vickery 
(2007). 
5  ‘Speech’ here refers to expression in all forms, including writings, images, and videos among others. 
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then a discussion on the history of political and electoral violence in Kenya before delving 
into how social media has been used to support and deter violence especially in 2007 and 
2013 elections. The final section outlines the challenges of regulating online hate speech 
and mobilisation for violence and proposes alternative policy options. 
 
 
2 Internet, mobile penetration and social 
media in Kenya 
 
The beginnings of Kenya’s digital transformation can be traced to the early years of the 
NARC government under former President Mwai Kibaki. The NARC coalition was elected on 
a reformist platform of reviving the economy. The administration made key critical decisions 
that served to further liberalise the economy, chief among them the information and 
telecommunications industry. This liberalisation had an impact on the organising, mobilising, 
financing and deterring of political and electoral violence in Kenya. In 1998, the Kenya 
Communications Act (1998) was enacted splitting the Kenya Postal and 
Telecommunications Company (KPTC) into separate entities namely the Telkom Kenya, the 
Postal Corporation of Kenya and the Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK) which 
later became the Communication Authority of Kenya (CA) (Souter and Kerrets 2012). The 
National Communications Secretariat was formed as a policy advisory body. The new 
arrangement provided Telkom Kenya with exclusive rights over internet connectivity, refined 
and reconstructed policymaking roles, established ICT market industry regulation, dispute 
resolution and operation of services among multiple players (Souter and Kerrets 2012).  
 
A year after these legal and policy changes, in 1999 Safaricom became the first operator to 
be awarded a mobile license. Subsequently Vodafone Group PLC acquired a 40 per cent 
stake and took over management of the company. Kencell Communications6 in partnership 
with Vivendi of France was awarded a GSM license in February 2000, becoming the second 
GSM operator and the first private firm to be awarded the license (Equity 2014). In April 
2014, CA further licensed three mobile virtual network operators, Finserve Africa Limited, 
Zioncell Kenya Limited and Mobile Pay Limited to compete in the Kenyan ICT market (CA 
2014; Safaricom 2014). According to the State of Internet Freedom Report 2016, Safaricom 
has a 65.6 per cent share of its mobile service market, followed by Airtel (17.5 per cent) and 
Telkom Kenya (Orange) (12.5 per cent) (CIPESA 2016).  
 
In November 2006, the Kenyan government decided to partner with the Emirates 
Telecommunication Establishment (Etisalat) to build TEAMS (the East African Marine 
System) as its own fibre optic cable. Kenya was initially connected through EASSY, the East 
African Submarine Cable System, but the government grew frustrated with its ownership and 
perceptions that South Africa wanted to control the cable. Kenya is now served by TEAMS 
and Sea Sub-marine Communication Limited (SEACOM), who provide up to 700,000 and 
1,250,000 Mbps of broadband respectively resulting in increased bandwidth and internet 
usage (CA 2016: 25). 
 
This paradigm shift, and the liberalisation reforms in the telecommunication industry resulted 
in the greater affordability of services, tariff rebalancing for fixed operators, and increased 
usage of internet and social media tools (Export Processing Zone Authority 2005). 
Competition within certain market segments led to price reduction for products and services 
making it affordable for general consumers.  
 
                                                 
6  Changed to Celtel in 2004, then Zain in 2008 and Airtel in 2010. 
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The estimated number of internet users has grown to 40.5 million users reflecting an internet 
penetration of 89.4 per cent (CA 2017:24). The CA also reports that mobile penetration now 
stands at 86.2 per cent with 39.1 million mobile subscribers and mobile money subscriptions 
standing at 27.5 million (CA 2017: 5). In addition, mobile data subscribers stood at            
21.5 million representing 99 per cent of the total of 25.7 million subscriptions, which can be 
attributed to the affordable costs of smartphones as well as mobile data bundles (CA 2017: 
23; CA 2016: 21). 
 
WhatsApp has become the ‘preferred’ channel for communication with an estimation of over   
10 million users in Kenya (BAKE 2016: 3). More often, content shared on WhatsApp finds its 
way on Twitter and Facebook. The ability to send pictures and videos makes WhatsApp 
more attractive than short text messages (SMS), especially for the urban population. 
Nevertheless, SMS still remains the most widely preferred messaging system, with a larger 
outreach since one does not need to have a smartphone or bundles to use it. During the 
2007 post-election violence, SMS became the preferred medium of mobilising for violence 
purposes, mapping hotspots, coordinating response mechanisms, and sharing information 
after the media blackout (CIPEV 2008). Actors have also been able to turn SMS into an 
online platform so that users can chat, blog and discuss vital topics using SMS-delivered 
web postings (Makinen and Kuira 2008). 
 
With the increase in mobile penetration came innovation. Safaricom Ltd pioneered the 
concept of mobile money and payments, dubbed M-pesa, which was quickly picked up by its 
consumers and competitors alike. Central Bank of Kenya statistics indicate that as of 
February 2017 mobile money transactions were valued at KSh 279,386bn (CBK 2017). With 
a deeply ingrained culture of giving and supporting, this has become a better option for 
collecting funds through mobile money, and serving as a transparent and cheap method for 
remitting cash for specific cases. M-Changa is one unique example of a platform used for 
fundraising (Miguel 2013). In terms of crisis and emergency response, these platforms have 
been used to collect funds from the Kenyan population geared towards humanitarian efforts. 
Other developments include M-shwari, which allows Safaricom users to access loans 
through M-pesa, and M-Akiba which allows citizens to invest by purchasing government 
bonds over the phone at very low prices. 
 
Growth and development of social media in Kenya thus was concomitant with an increase in 
availability and speed of the internet, as well as the increase in ownership of smartphones in 
both urban and rural centres over the last decade (Kamwaria et al. 2015: 117). With digital 
technology then came multiple sources of information. In a relatively short time, bloggers 
have achieved an unprecedented fame and status as platforms for sourcing and sharing 
information.7 They are one of the most reliable alternative sources of news for most Kenyans 
compared to mainstream media because they provide access to more diverse views than 
mainstream media. Blogs publish emotional, detailed and raw accounts of reactions that 
challenge mainstream media narratives. Some blogs aim at promoting peace and justice; 
others have been a source of biased information, tribal prejudices and different forms of hate 
speech. 
 
The informal coalition of Kenya’s Twitter population, commonly known as ‘Kenyans on 
Twitter’ (#KOT) has been instrumental in influencing online public participation in 
policymaking processes (BAKE 2016). KOT has on many occasions engaged in fierce 
critique, pointing out and pushing policymakers to take actions on vital issues (Oyelowo and 
Moitui 2015). Diamond (2010) has coined the term ‘Liberation Technology’ to describe the 
                                                 
7  Prominent blogs discussing national governance issues include Gathara.blogspot.co.ke, Wandianjoya.com, 
kahawatungu.com, Owaahh.com, info.mzalendo.com, brainstorm.co.ke, kanalispeaks.wordpress.com and 
maunduville.blogspot.co.ke. Other bloggers such as lifeinmombasa.com, county-yangu.com/default, 
kakamega411.com, loitokitok.com and laikipiaruralvoices.blogspot.co.ke, among others, have content that focuses on 
specific counties. 
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role ICT and social media play in affording the common people a united voice against 
oppression in authoritarian regimes and thereby securing their own liberty (Diamond 2010). 
Diamond notes that ‘Liberation Technology’ is able to enable citizens like #KOT to ‘report 
news, expose wrongdoing, express opinions, mobilize protest, monitor elections, scrutinize 
government, deepen participation, and expand the horizons of freedom’ (Diamond 2010: 70). 
 
Since the onset of multiparty politics in 1992, Kenya’s elections have been synonymous with 
violence. This acquired deadly proportions during the 2007 elections with technology and 
social media being used to fuel the conflict as well as drive peace messages. It was during 
this time that social media was first used to not only propagate hate speech and mobilise for 
violence, but also identify and map out hotspots. Since then, social media has increasingly 
become an indispensable tool in the Kenyan political and governance architecture. In order 
to fully understand how social media and digital technology have become embedded in 
political conflict and peacebuilding during electoral periods over the years, the below section 
looks at Kenya’s experience with political and electoral violence since 1992.  
 
 
3 Background of political and electoral 
violence in Kenya 
 
3.1  1992–2002 elections 
 
The 1992 poll is important to the nation’s history since it was the first round of competitive 
elections following the repeal of section 2A, changing the country from a single-party to a 
multiparty state and essentially redefining Kenyan politics and elections. The resulting 
increased political competition coupled with the underlying political and socioeconomic 
grievances and ethnic mobilisation of voters during the elections, contributed to increased 
probability of violence (Wairuri 2017: 1). 
 
The 1992 pre-election violence first broke out at Meteitei farm in Tinderet in Nandi District in 
the Rift Valley Province when Kalenjin ‘warriors’ attacked Luos living in the area under the 
pretence of a land dispute. However, the attack quickly assumed a larger ethnic and political 
dimension when victims reported that their attackers had vowed to drive non-Kalenjins and 
opponents of Kenya African National Union (KANU) from the Rift Valley Province (GoK 
1992; HRW 1993). Sponsored by highly placed Kalenjin and Maasai politicians in the Moi 
Government, attackers targeted the Luo, Kikuyu, Luhya and Gusii tribes in Rift Valley 
Province who were considered ‘outsiders’ to the region and opposition supporters (GoK 
1992; HRW 1993). It is estimated that 1,500 Kenyans died and at least 300,000 others were 
displaced between 1991 and 1993 in different parts of Western, Nyanza and Rift Valley 
Provinces (KHRC 2001). 
 
Violence once again broke out in the build-up and aftermath of the 1997 general election. 
Clashes involving the Kisii, Luo and Maasai along the borders of Gucha, Trans Mara, Migori 
and Kisii Districts in late 1997 left villages charred and thousands of people displaced. 
Masked as cases of rampant cattle rustling, these clashes belied a new political calculus to 
displace communities that were thought to be sympathetic to the opposition. The violence 
left more than 1,500 people dead and at least 300,000 displaced, some of whom remained 
displaced into 1999 (Kagwanja 2001). The victims were mostly non-Kalenjins, including 
Kikuyu, Luo, Kisii and Luhya. 
 
The same year, other violence unfolded in Likoni, Mombasa. Between 200 and 500 Digo 
militants ambushed and burnt down the Likoni police station killing six police officers, 
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escaping with 30–50 guns and 3,000–5,000 rounds of live ammunition (HRW 2002; Mazrui 
2001). According to Human Rights Watch, the Kenyan government was behind the 
recruitment, organising, training and arming of the Digo warriors. Armed with bows and 
arrows, these warriors were thought to have been trained in the Kaya Bombo forest. They 
attacked residents from other parts of Kenya who were thought to support the opposition. An 
estimated 100 people were killed and 100,000 displaced (Mazrui 2001). 
  
At the same time, within Nairobi and major urban towns, politicians across the political divide 
organised and sponsored gangs and militias with the aim of altering the political and 
electoral environment. The most prominent, enjoying political patronage and backing was 
the KANU-linked Jeshi la Mzee which was deployed to break up the National Convention 
Executive Council (NCEC) change the constitution movement rallies mostly in Nairobi and 
Mombasa (Kagwanja 2004; Mwagiru et al. 2002).8 So successful was Jeshi la Mzee that it 
became a generic term for a plethora of private militias organised by the political elite 
including those from the opposition. Some of these groups included Jeshi la Embakasi, Jeshi 
la Mbela and Jeshi la King’ole but they did not acquire the kind of high-level operations that 
were associated with Jeshi la Mzee.  
  
The 2002 general election was hailed as the most democratic and peaceful in Kenya’s short 
history of multiparty politics. Yet, the political party primaries were intensely contested and 
saw the widespread use of violence, intimidation and threats. The violence had roots in a 
culture of contemporary political violence that was shaped over the previous two election 
cycles. Anticipating the potential of violence to mar the 2002 elections, the Police 
Commissioner in March 2002 outlawed nearly two dozen vigilante groups and private 
armies. However, the ban was not enforced neither did the groups cease to exist or operate. 
Enforcement of the ban also failed because there was no political will to break the illegal 
groups, since they were important for both political mobilisation and suppression of voters 
using violence. Past elections testified to the fact that violence ‘worked’ and hence the 
means seemed to justify the end (Mutahi 2005). Further, these groups operated in the 
shadows, coming together when called upon but otherwise had a very light footprint and 
were difficult to trace or break apart.  
 
3.2  2007 elections 
 
Kenya’s 2007/08 post-election violence demonstrated the effects that social media and 
digital technology can have in propelling violence. Immediately after the final 2007 
Presidential vote count was announced, violence broke out in at least five of the country’s 
eight provinces.9 According to the Khadiagala (2008: 4–5), three forms of violence mutated 
and intensified as the conflict evolved. The first form was disorganised, spontaneous 
protests at the announcement of the result across the country. The second form was 
organized militia activity, starting in the Rift Valley and gradually spreading to Central 
Province. In the Rift Valley, militia activity carried out mainly by the Kalenjin ethnic group 
against the Kikuyu and other affiliated communities such as the Kisii and Kamba took the 
form of deaths, destruction of property, and displacement of people. In response, revenge 
attacks by the Mungiki, a pre-dominantly Kikuyu illegal armed group were carried out in 
Naivasha and Nairobi’s slums. The third form of violence was the excessive use of force by 
the government’s security forces in attempts to contain the initial spontaneous protests, 
largely in Nyanza Province. Over 1,500 people were killed and 600,000 displaced (CIPEV 
                                                 
8 Frustrated by the lack of free political space despite Section 2(a) being repealed, the churches and human rights NGOs 
began a campaign on the need to overhaul the Constitution. The constitutional campaign coalesced around the 
National Convention Assembly (NCA) and its executive, the National Convention Executive Council (NCEC), which was 
able to garner substantial support from the public. 
9  Provinces were abolished by the 2010 Constitution. 
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2008). The violence stopped after the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation team10 
under the mediation of Kofi Annan signed an agreement on ending the violence. The 
agreement called for the demobilisation and disarmament of militias responsible for the 
ethnic attacks. 
 
As documented by many organisations, social media and digital technology were used to 
spread hateful and divisive language (Comninos 2013; Fox-Penner 2012; Benesch 2014; 
Bayne 2008; EU 2008; KNCHR 2008). The Waki Report on the 2007/08 post-election 
violence found that traditional and social media played a significant role in the inflammation 
of the violence both during and after the elections (CIPEV 2008). The KNCHR was more 
blunt in its report, saying,  
 
one thing that will remain memorable about the 2007 elections is the role played by 
all manner of information from all manner of sources, unsolicited and solicited – 
SMS, blogs, emails, newsletter, leaflets, not to mention the newspapers, TV and 
radio sources. (KNCHR 2008: 29) 
 
Mainstream media sources were also heavily criticised with some feeling that they did not 
maintain a level of professionalism at a time where the broadcasts ought to have been more 
sensitive (Abdi and Deane 2008). Vernacular radio stations were also accused of incitement 
owing to biases to certain political leaders, which at times turned to hate directed towards 
the political rivals and ethnic communities (Rambaud 2008: 74; Gustafsson 2016). What 
essentially was being circulated through social media found its way to the mainstream 
media, further fuelling violence. 
 
However, as discussed in subsequent sections, when the violence escalated, social media 
was also used for countering hate speech and peace messaging. Popular tweets calling for 
peace were re-tweeted and people shared Facebook messages to counter the incitement 
and hatred. The mainstream media subsequently picked up and used these messages and 
broadcasted them calling for peace. 
 
3.3  2013 elections  
 
The 2013 elections are particularly important since they marked the first elections after the 
promulgation of the 2010 Constitution. The Constitution transformed the electoral system 
and process in Kenya, principally through the devolved system of governance which created          
47 counties and introduced elections for six offices – President, Governors, Senators, MPs, 
Members of County Assembly (MCAs), and women’s representatives. The newly established 
offices naturally led to increased political competition, which was also devolved to local 
levels owing to opportunities in the county governments.  
 
Social media and digital technologies were also used at unprecedented levels during these 
elections. Aspirants for both national and county political seats took to popular sites such as 
Facebook and Twitter to mobilise support while on the campaign trail (Ndela 2016: 464–65; 
Smith 2012). The parties used the new media to communicate with their supporters as well 
as party organising (Odinga 2013). In 2013, during the live televised debate held before the 
elections, Kenyans were given an opportunity through Twitter, SMS and Facebook to 
question the presidential aspirants. They were an important source of information on political 
                                                 
10  The team comprised members of the Panel of Eminent African Personalities headed by former UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan tasked by Africa Union to lead the mediation between PNU and ODM. Other panel members were former 
Tanzania President Benjamin Mkapa and former Mozambique first lady Graca Machel. Each party – Government/PNU 
and ODM – had two representatives each in the team. On 28 February 2008, the parties signed ‘An Agreement on 
Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government,’ otherwise known as the National Accord, and agreed to adjust 
the constitution to provide for power sharing. They also committed to implement an ambitious four-point agenda. See 
www.dialoguekenya.org.  
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developments, especially during the tallying process (EU EOM 2013: 23). Political parties 
have continued relying heavily on social media to deliver news. 
 
The atmosphere around these elections was particularly tense following the 2007/08 post-
election violence, for which both the then Jubilee presidential candidate and his running 
mate were facing crimes against humanity charges at the ICC at that time. Tensions then 
continued when the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) announced 
that a petition process challenging the presidential results had been initiated after the 
declaration of Uhuru Kenyatta as president, with a narrow percentage above the 50 per cent 
+ 1 threshold.11 Despite the tension, the election period was largely peaceful. Few and 
isolated incidences of violence and situations of unrest were, however, recorded on the 
election day, i.e. in Mombasa, Marsabit and Wajir, and following the announcement of the 
results of the presidential petition, i.e. in areas in Kisumu and Nairobi (EU EOM 2013: 26). It 
can thus be concluded that the violence occurred more at the sub-national level rather than 
at the national level. 
 
A number of factors contributed to a predominantly peaceful election, at the national level 
including massive national peace messaging driven by state and non-state actors. Social 
media was largely used by state and non-state actors to send peace messages. As we shall 
see later, this digital peace messaging had its own effect. The state also mapped and 
deployed security forces to potential hotspots to help avert unrest with 99,000 police officers 
having been reportedly deployed on the election day. Further, the cases of Uhuru Kenyatta, 
William Ruto and Joshua Sang at the ICC also deterred politicians from organising or 
engaging in violence for fear of prosecution (EU EOM 2013: 5–6; ISS Paper No 237). 
Another important factor may be the reformed judiciary. IPSOS polls showed that a large 
percentage of the population had trust in the judiciary. Though challenging the credibility of 
the elections, Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD) presidential candidate, Raila 
Odinga commented, ‘It has happened again just like in 2007 but this time we have an 
independent judiciary’ (EU EOM 2013: 33). The tension may also have been eased owing to 
the speedy conclusion of the presidential election petition, the decision having been 
rendered by the Supreme Court within 14 days as required by the Constitution. 
 
3.4  Towards the 2017 elections 
 
The 2017 political party nominations were fraught with irregularities including bribery, use of 
violence, intimidation and harassment; destruction of voting material, lack of coordination at 
the tallying centres and targeted attacks meted against minority and marginalized groups 
such as women aspirants (KNCHR 2017). The Kenya National Commission on Human 
Rights (KNCHR) reported instances of violence in all of the 33 counties monitored, 
manifested in different forms including assault on aspirants and their supporters, agents and 
voters, rivalry during rallies, attempted rape, alleged abductions, intimidation, and use of 
firearms to threaten aspirants (KNCHR 2017: 5). 
  
The chaos and violence can perhaps be attributed to the increased competition for elected 
office in 2017 owing to devolution. 2017 has seen the highest number of candidates with 
15,082 candidates being cleared to contest including 3,752 independent candidates 
(Cheporir 2017). Transfer of resources to counties has seen stiff contestation for seats of 
governor and MCA (South and CHRIPS 2017), contestation which has resulted in violent 
outcomes for example in Meru, Kisumu, Migori, Nairobi, and Uasin Gishu. Campaigns at 
county level have had an ethnic and even clan-based dimension, this is likely to flare up 
unresolved local tensions (Reliefweb 2017). 
 
                                                 
11  According to article 138(4) of the Constitution, a candidate shall be declared elected as president if the candidate 
receives (a) more than half of all the votes cast in the election; and (b) at least 25 per cent of the votes cast in each of 
more than half of the counties. 
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It is clear that social media and digital technology are a key aspect in the 2017 elections. To 
start with, digital technology will be used in the management of the electoral process, 
specifically in identification and transmission processes by the IEBC. This in itself poses a 
threat since failure in technology, as was seen in the party primaries, may trigger electoral 
violence. The internet was also a major avenue for political campaigns by all the parties and 
aspirants, who have not only set up websites, but also employed bloggers and social media 
managers to manage their accounts and constantly put out their campaign messages and 
counter those of their rivals. Jubilee party has contracted the services of global data mining 
company, Cambridge Analytica, in the run-up to the August presidential election (Keter 
2017). The company is known for trawling Facebook and buying up commercial consumer 
datasets to identify ‘persuadable’ voters whom it then bombards with social media posts and 
adverts. 
 
Similar to 2007 and 2013, posts laced with hatred and intimidation are being circulated on 
social media and SMS platforms. Some people have taken pictures of leaflets circulating in 
different areas and circulated them on WhatsApp, thereby continuing to rapidly spread hate 
and inciting messages both online and offline. On the other hand, the peace messages have 
also been circulated to counter the hate messages. 
 
There have also been attempts by government to curb hate speech in social media. The 
government has identified 176 social media accounts involved in propagating hate speech 
and warned administrators will be held liable if they do not moderate and control the content 
and discussions generated on their platforms. Further, 31 cases are under prosecution 
across the country on hate speech charges (The Star 2017).  
 
The Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government has reported that it is 
crowdsourcing to monitor hate speech and incitement to violence in the country before, 
during, and after the elections (Mwere and Moseti 2017). The NCIC and CA also published 
guidelines in June 2017 (NCIC and CA 2017), which among other things require that political 
messages shall not contain inciting threatening, or discriminatory languages that may 
expose an individual or group to violence, hatred, and discrimination on the basis of 
ethnicity, tribe, race, colour, religion, gender, disability, or otherwise. The guidelines 
additionally place an onus on ‘content authors to authenticate, validate the source and 
truthfulness of their content prior to publishing’. Administrators of social media platforms are 
also required to moderate and control the content and discussions generated on their 
platform whereas Mobile Network Operators are empowered to refuse transmission of 
political messages over their network, with reasons, once it determines that it does not 
comply with the guidelines (NCIC and CA 2017). The guidelines have, however, been met 
with criticism by journalists who warn that the guidelines could constrict the Kenyan press 
from reporting and commenting freely on political events (Mwere and Moseti 2017). 
 
The IEBC has also launched the Election Security Arrangement Programme (ESAP), 
seeking to undertake election security coordination and assist in managing security aspects 
of the 2017 General Elections. Its partners include the National Police Service (NPS); Office 
of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP); United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP); Uwiano Secretariat; National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict 
Management (NSC); Independent Police Oversight Authority (IPOA); and the Office of the 
Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP) (IEBC 2017). The IEBC also has in place an Electoral 
Risk Management Tool. This is an early warning information tool used to identify risk factors 
and map them in electoral risk maps. The electoral risk maps that are generated are shared 
with relevant stakeholders depending on the risk for instance, if it is hate speech then this 
information is shared with NCIC while if it is criminal activity then the police are involved. In 
running this tool, the IEBC relies on information from different sources including the media; 
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IEBC staff and data collected, security agencies, citizens, and existing early warning 
systems such as Uwiano, Hello Kenya, and Sauti Mashinani.12  
 
 
4 The growing impact of social media on 
the political and electoral landscape  
 
Digital technology and social media have provided state and non-state actors alike with 
platforms to monitor and map out violence hotspots, information that could be used for rapid 
response purposes. This therefore presents a mixed bag of opportunities for policymakers 
since social media can be used for both promotion and prevention of violence. This section 
explores three themes that are significant in the Kenya context: social media as a conveyer 
of threats and mobiliser for electoral violence; as a mobiliser against electoral violence and 
hate speech; and as a documenter and forecaster of electoral violence. 
 
4.1  Conveyer of threats and mobiliser for electoral violence 
 
Political leaders have taken to social media to spread propaganda (Kamwaria et al. 2015: 
118) as well as carry out ethnic mobilisation of voters, sometimes spewing hate speech and 
incitement.13 In some places, these hateful remarks are based on clan considerations. 
According to the CIPEV Report, the increased spread of hateful remarks through different 
media, including social media, had an influence in the occurrence of the post-election 
violence in 2007/08 (CIPEV 2008).  
 
Shortly after Kibaki was proclaimed the winner on 30 December 2007, the Kenyan internal 
security minister John Michuki announced a ban on live broadcasts. Given the news 
blackout, text messages became the primary means by which people could update each 
other on the electoral outcome and its fallout. This was double edged: while the SMS 
platform was used to rally support, especially by victims of the violence, it was also used to 
spread hate speech and incite people. Some citizens used the SMS platform to stir emotions 
regarding the alleged stealing of votes and inciting people to attack other communities 
perceived to be allied with Kibaki and the PNU (Odinga 2013). Hate speech through social 
media was on a very large scale thus contributing to tension and a hostile atmosphere (iHub 
2013). The popular community forum, Mashada, was shut down by its owner in January 
2008 since he could not control the torrent of hateful and violent speech pouring onto the site 
(Hersman 2008; Benesch 2014: 3).     
 
With mobile phone penetration on the rise, competition has increased between networks 
who in turn offer their subscribers favourable deals on calls, SMS, and internet bundles 
among others. It has also led to the development of several mobile-based applications for 
communication. WhatsApp has become one of the most popular platforms in Kenya owing to 
its relative affordability and ability to share different media through it. Moreover, it allows for 
group messages to be sent privately between members. A key informant working in the ICT 
sector expressed sentiments that WhatsApp poses a risk of increased hate speech and 
incitement to violence since it is more private and thus people have less fear of what they 
post.14 It is only members of the WhatsApp groups who get the content, and the nature of 
most of these groups is that they are formed by peers or people with close relations. Hence, 
                                                 
12  Remarks by IEBC representative during Workshop on ‘Monitoring Violence in Kenya’s Elections: Exploring Media and 
Digital Reporting Systems for Early Warning, Response and Analysis’, held at Strathmore Business School, Nairobi,     
4 July 2017. 
13  Interview with a key informant working in the ICT sector, 5 May 2017. 
14  Interview with a key informant, 5 May 2017. 
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harmful content shared on the WhatsApp group is rarely reported to authorities and the least 
the members do is reprimand the content generator. However, the chances of the post being 
shared on other groups and other social media platforms is high due to the fact that people 
belong to many WhatsApp groups and may share the messages on these groups. This 
increases the ability of mobile phone technology to be used for violence mobilisation since it 
enables sharing of content to a wide audience and facilitates real time coordination at an 
operational level (Pierskalla and Hollenback 2013: 210). 
  
To an extent, the migration of ethnic hatred and incitement to the internet and social media 
in Kenya is a testament to the effectiveness of measures taken to regulate hate speech. 
Under section 13 and 62 of the National Cohesion and Integration Act (2008), hate speech is 
considered a criminal offence. It stipulates that a person who uses speech that includes 
words, programs and images seen as, ‘threatening, abusive or insulting or involves the use 
of threatening or abusive language commits an offence if such a person intends to stir up 
ethnic hatred’. The NCIC has actively pursued hate speech suspects, summoning politicians 
allegedly engaged in ethnic incitement. This has suppressed ethnic incitement in public 
political discourse, such as in the speeches of politicians and aspirants, and in official 
campaign material. However, digital and social media provide new ways to spread 
inflammatory political messages. Unfortunately, the NCIC have not managed to successfully 
bring to prosecution any person on hate speech largely due to the lack of competence, 
political will, technology and the ability to tame online hate speech (Kaberia and Musau 
2013).  
 
4.2  Mobiliser against electoral violence and hate speech 
 
During the 2007/08 post-election violence, social media played a significant role in promoting 
peace and safeguarding against the spread of hate speech. This was for example, in the use 
of re-tweets which allowed users to record the importance they attached to an item of news. 
Popular tweets promoting peace therefore spread very quickly (Enjolras et al. 2012: 10). In 
addition to re-tweets, hashtags also played a role in online conversations and the 
communities that had been formed online, which also bolstered the position of traditional 
media online. Counter speech, defined as crowd-sourced response to extremism or hateful 
content (Bartlett and Krasodomski-Jones 2015), was also popular following the 2013 
elections especially by media personalities, and companies. Television broadcasters used 
established platforms such as Twitter and Facebook to spread positive messages and 
encourage viewers to remain calm and patient (Benesch 2014: 9). Messages promoting 
peace were also circulated through SMS messages. 
 
Companies also encouraged the spread of peaceful messages online. For instance, Crown 
Paint through ‘Uniting Colours of Kenya’ offered cash and airtime rewards to people who 
sent online peace messages including photos, poems and stories to each other and to the 
company (Benesch 2014: 10). The campaign was launched in Kibera, one of the most 
affected areas during the post-election violence in 2007–08. Safaricom partnered with a non-
government organisation Sisi Ni Amani to promote peace through text messages, as well. It 
donated 50 million free text messages aimed at countering dangerous speech that was 
being used to spread violence. 
 
In the lead-up to the 2013 elections, Safaricom released Guidelines for Political Mobile 
Advertising on Safaricom’s Premium Rate Messaging Service. Under these guidelines, 
anyone intending to send bulk SMS of a political nature would first have to submit an 
application to Safaricom, which would vet the content to ensure they did not contain 
instances of incitement, ethnic hatred and hate speech (Mutinda 2012; IHRB 2013: 3). In 
addition, the Communications Authority released Guidelines for the Prevention of 
Transmission of Undesirable Bulk Content/Messages via Electronic Communications 
Networks which were to be applied by all mobile network operators in the country (CA 2012). 
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The guidelines mandated the network providers to pre-screen bulk messages containing 
political content before sending. To do so, service providers installed a firewall that could 
detect messages containing particular words such as ‘kill,’ which were automatically flagged 
for further scrutiny. Ostensibly, mobile phone service providers were blocking more than 
300,000 text messages per day, which were suspected to contain hate speech (IHRB 2013; 
Mukindia 2013). However, this process of blocking or removing content and the mechanisms 
applied was not transparent and readily available for public scrutiny. The decisions of the 
mobile telephone companies were also not subject to review by public bodies to allow for 
democratic scrutiny and to ensure that citizens’ rights to freedom of expression were not 
violated.15 
 
Use of technology for peace campaigns had another side to it. Unaffordability as well as the 
uneven distribution of digital infrastructure in Kenya means that some people are unable to 
access the internet or mobile phone. Indeed, it has been seen that differences in disposable 
income are associated with commensurate differences in social media use (Bolton 2013).  
 
Some have argued that the numerous online and SMS peace campaigns during the 2013 
elections gave credence to assumptions or ideas that people had no legitimate reasons to 
engage in violence (Oddsdotir 2014: 5). The criticism of platforms like Uwiano, PEACETXT 
and others was that they had the effect of pacifying the violence rather than providing lasting 
solutions to the grievances that were considered to be factors causing the people to fight 
(CIPEV 2008). Critics have also commented that the media, including both mainstream and 
social media went so far in their pacification efforts in 2013 that they censored legitimate 
speech because it had the possibility of triggering conflict (O’Hare and Moss 2014; ICG 
2013; Muriithi and Page 2013). 
 
During and after the 2013 elections, the Kenyan mainstream media tended to self-censor, 
avoiding emotive issues such as land, voter tallying, and the confidence in the IEBC to 
conduct free and fair elections (Oddsdotir 2014: 6; O‘Hare and Moss 2014; ICG 2013, 
Muriithi and Page 2013). The media reportedly developed strategies to prevent airing 
divisive messages from politicians by pre-recording and editing campaigns before broadcast. 
They also used the ‘naming and shaming’ technique (Bensech 2013) whereby they openly 
condemned utterances that were felt to constitute hate speech (Gustafsson 2016: 10). 
 
This self-censorship was attributed to the criticism after the 2007 elections that media 
reports had been insensitive and, by having focused heavily on controversial topics, fuelled 
anger that triggered the violence (Abdi and Deane 2008). This criticism was largely aimed at 
smaller media groups that were more weakly regulated, such as vernacular radio stations, 
particularly those that had call-in shows allowing individuals to make statements which were 
divisive and inflammatory (Bensech 2013; Waki Commission 2008; Rambaud 2008: 74). 
Mainstream media nonetheless took this as collective criticism against all media and opted 
to lean on the side of caution in their coverage of the 2013 elections. Oddsdotir (2014) also 
attributes the media’s self-censorship to criticism by the then Inspector General of Police, 
David Kimaiyo, just before the elections, that controversial topics should be avoided on the 
campaign trail because they are emotive and can trigger violence (Oddsdotir 2014: 6; The 
Star 2013). This self-censorship has been said to reveal a society frightened by its own 
capacity for violence (Wrong 2013: Gathara 2013). 
 
Muriithi and Page (2013) expressed that the 2013 elections reflected a clash between the 
responsibility of the media to hold candidates accountable and their responsibility to promote 
peace. The effect was that the media provided little space for the public to voice any criticism 
or discontent, basically limiting the public capacity to hold their leaders accountable (Were 
2013). However, social media provided an avenue for people to freely engage in discourse 
                                                 
15  Interview with a key informant, May 2017. 
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concerning election matters, discourse which seemed to be missing from mainstream media 
sources.  
 
In 2017, the mood appears to have shifted slightly such that people on social media 
advocate not only for peace but for justice and credible elections. Particularly on Twitter, 
many users have advocated for credible elections, which they argue is tied to peaceful 
elections.  
  
4.3  Documenter and forecaster of electoral violence 
 
Digital technology and social media may also enable the development of effective early 
warning systems that serve to prevent violence. They allow for micro-level responses to 
conflict which enables stakeholders at the local level to prevent or evade conflict. This 
bottom-up approach is seen to be more effective than state-centric or top-down responses 
where the situation calls for integrated action (OECD 2009). The use of digital technology 
then responds to the need to create people-centric early warning mechanisms so as to 
effectively empower individuals and communities to respond to threats that face them.  
 
Crowdsourcing, which refers to a model aimed at solving problems through the use of online 
communities (Brabham 2013), was widely employed during the 2007/08 post-election 
violence and in the run up to elections in 2017. Crowdsourcing encouraged citizens to report 
and document violent incidents occurring during the period of post-election violence using 
online platforms, including sharing of videos and photos. This enabled the actors to track 
and analyse structural tensions, social divides and flash points (iHub 2013: 6). It also created 
and provided ways for ‘digital humanitarians’ to volunteer and help (Caldwell 2013). 
 
The Ushahidi platform was established in 2008 to document the post-election violence. It 
was then improved in 2013 to collect data on a mass scale which could be used for violence 
prevention (Comninos 2013: 11). Social media tools such as Facebook, Twitter and SMS-
delivered web postings, acted as platforms to provide real-time data of what was happening 
in polling stations, and situations all over the country. Reports included individual 
experiences such as vote bribery, cases of violence and vote buying. Ushahidi was thus able 
to cover areas that journalists were unable to access (Ndela 2016: 467). Ushahidi has in 
2017 partnered with civil society organisations, peace and youth networks. Most of these 
civil society actors are involved in advocacy activities and initiatives involving the use of 
messaging as a mechanism to spread peace messages.  
 
Uchaguzi, an election monitoring tool powered by Ushahidi crowdsourced local information 
on electoral process from citizens (Yanning 2012). It has created a convergence point for all 
CSOs, monitors, and other networks to report incidents of incitement and mobilisation for 
violence, information which is shared with IEBC. Users send SMS to the Uchaguzi platform, 
messages are analysed and used for conflict early warning and response. They then verify 
and then relay the information to authorities for quick action. In areas with limited internet 
access, Uchaguzi has a toll-free number (201666) for reporting cases.16 This platform is 
already working well; for example, recently they were able to report to police a case of 
violence in Mauche, Molo, which had been posted on social media. After verifying and 
reporting, the GSU were able to respond and stop the violence within 15–30 minutes of the 
call.17 This shows effectiveness of social media monitoring when it is connected to the right 
actors and right response mechanisms designed.  
 
Uwiano Platform for Peace has also been integral in documenting evidence of political and 
electoral violence since 2010. Features of the program initiated by PeaceNet Kenya among 
                                                 
16  Interview with a key informant, 5 May 2017. 
17  ibid. 
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other stakeholders included online tools for tracking, reporting and retrieving evidence of 
‘dangerous speech’ with potential of causing violence, incitement and other forms of violence 
instigation in text, images, voice, and video (Communication Initiative Network 2010). Using 
the platform, people were able to send messages of potential violence or violence-related 
situations through their toll-free SMS short code 6397 (Communication Initiative Network 
2010). These alerts were received at the National Steering Committee (NSC) on 
Peacebuilding and Conflict Management or PeaceNet. Further, these messages were 
classified into several categories namely informative, threat, positive, hate speech, 
incitement to violence or coded message. For purposes of verification, team members 
involved would call senders of the messages as well as concerned authorities for emergency 
action or rapid response (Communication Initiative Network 2010).  
 
The program worked with the assistance of a pool of monitors spread across the country 
with a particular focus on areas prone to violence. To effectively achieve its intended 
objectives, a media campaign was used to inform Kenyans on ways to report incidents of 
violence. Implementing partners would convene on a weekly basis and engage the media in 
briefing sessions on emerging trends from data collected and synthesised. Further, the 
regular meetings were aimed at consolidating reports and reviewing progress of the project 
whilst highlighting best practices (Communication Initiative Network 2010). The corrective 
measures involved summoning of perpetrators of incitement and dangerous hate speech. 
This was done publicly to send a message that those implicated in propagating hateful 
political communication would be prosecuted.  
 
Facebook pages such as ‘Elections Iwitness Kenya’ and ‘Kenya Elections 2013’ were also 
established before the 2013 elections with the aim of allowing Facebook users to share 
experiences and witness accounts of elections conduct (Ndela 2016: 467). Various social 
media sites also permitted the uploading and sharing of videos showing violence and thus 
allowing mapping of the violence and generating public attention which would facilitate 
prevention efforts as well as responses to violence (Ndela 2016: 468). WhatsApp has also 
been instrumental in sharing videos, pictures and information during crisis and volatile 
situations in parts of the country.  
 
The Umati monitoring project was established in 2013 with the aim of scouring the internet 
for speech that could incite hatred and violence (referred to as dangerous speech). Umati, 
through iHub researchers who searched and monitored Kenyan blogs, Tweets, online 
newspaper comments, Facebook pages, and other sites, produced a database of such 
speech and classified it according to its capacity to provoke violence using the dangerous 
speech guidelines developed by Susan Bensech (Benesch 2013, 2014: 11; iHub 2013: 7). 
Reports from monitoring conducted in November 2012 demonstrate 28 per cent of the 
sample of 792 online statements as containing ‘dangerous speech’ (iHub 2013). In some of 
the statements speakers suggested that they faced threats from other groups. Further, 
Umati reported an increase in cases of ‘dangerous speech’ especially as the election drew 
closer. The period after the elections was characterised by an increase in inflammatory 
statements as Kenyans awaited a court ruling disputing the election results (iHub 2013: 7). 
 
Umati used different applications, which gave it an advantage in monitoring the violence. 
Through Trendsmap, which gives a detailed view of current trends on Twitter with the help of 
Google Maps, Umati was able to depict the geographical location of each trend (iHub 2013: 
7). Umati was also able to monitor the violence as it unfolded through the use of the 
application, Open Status Search tool, which allows one to do keyword searches of public 
conversations on Facebook (iHub 2013: 7). 
 
In February 2008, the founder of a popular community forum, Mashada, put up a new 
website called ‘I have no tribe’ after having to shut down Mashada the month earlier owing to 
his inability to control the spread of hateful messages on the site. This site spread messages 
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of peace and encouraged unity among Kenyans. According to Benesch, the site ‘was an 
experiment with counter speech, or speech intended to diminish hatred and violence, in the 
midst of an outbreak of both’ (Benesch 2014: 6). Likewise, Umati team members and other 
experts started an initiative called ‘Nipe Ukweli’ which was aimed at refuting false rumours 
online and invited Kenyans to reduce dangerous speech (Benesch 2014: 14).  
 
Drawing from 2007 and 2013 experiences, state and non-state actors monitoring election 
violence have formed linkages, connecting key institutions like NCIC and police for faster 
sharing of information for action. In preparation for 2017 elections, the Sentinel Project and 
iHub Research have created Una Hakika (‘Are you sure?’), a mobile phone-based 
information service that monitors the spread of rumours and acts to check and contain them. 
Una Hakika subscribers can report rumours they hear through text messages, voice calls, or 
by talking to one of nearly 200 trained volunteer community ambassadors present in           
16 villages. Rumours relating to actual or impending violence are prioritized and reported to 
local authorities (Alliance for Building Peace 2017). In addition, to obtaining information from 
subscribers and community ambassadors, the Una Hakika team has also established 
relationships with community leaders, religious leaders, local authorities, and other NGOs 
operating in the area. These other actors are asked to help verify rumours if they relate to 
their expertise; for example, consulting the Red Cross on rumours relating to natural 
disasters (Alliance for Building Peace 2017). 
 
In order to ensure investigation and prosecution of those suspected of hate speech and 
incitement to violence, the ODPP has established a framework for inter-agency collaboration 
between its office, the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI), IEBC and NCIC for 
effective detection, investigation and timely prosecution of election offences. The team of 
105 officers will be served by a 24-hour secretariat to coordinate and facilitate the 
prosecution team (Standard 2017). These efforts show the realisation by state and non-state 
actors that social media can play an important role in early warning and response. 
 
The main challenge however in using social media to forecast violence is ensuring the 
veracity and authenticity of the information gathered before it leads to violence. A key 
informant working on online elections monitoring explained,  
 
The only thing to thwart is the fake results, it is just highly emotive. Conversations on 
results need to be very careful. We need to document result and crowdsource 
verified results from all over. We are running this with my campaign monitoring team 
to get monitors to tally in every polling centre. Spreading this verified information can 
then counter the fake results that will be posted and we can try to have those fake 
results pulled down quickly.18  
 
The other concern is the capacity of police and NCIC to attend to all cases of incitement and 
mobilisation reported from the social media platforms in the lead up to elections. The sheer 
volume might make it difficult to respond in a systematic way. 
 
While research and practice has shown that technologies and new media have the potential 
for informing conflict prevention and mitigation efforts, its success largely depends on how it 
is employed in the right context and channelled to the responsible agencies. If the wrong 
technology is used, then different data and results would be generated which would not be 
useful for conflict prevention and mitigation. Thus, the actors undertaking prevention 
initiatives should let the context inform what kind of technology is needed and what kind of 
approach will work best (Mancini and O’Reilly 2013: 1). 
 
 
                                                 
18  Interview with a key informant, 5 May 2017. 
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5 Regulating and responding to ‘digital 
violence’ 
 
Opinion is divided on what should be done with regard to hate speech and incitement to 
ethnic hatred on the internet and social media since it can lead to violence. Some have 
argued that Kenya should follow other African countries like Ethiopia, Cameroon, Uganda, 
Gambia, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Gabon, whose governments shut down 
internet access during elections when violence broke out or was merely expected.19 This 
however will not curb incitement and mobilisation to violence offline. It also might have the 
opposite effect of harming Kenya’s large mobile money economy and innovative businesses 
supported by it. More detrimental is that such efforts would be an affront to Freedom of 
Expression guaranteed in the Constitution. 
 
Regulation of hate speech, incitement and online mobilisation to violence in Kenya is in its 
infancy in terms of law and policy. Attempts to regulate the internet and social media have in 
some instances opened the floodgates for state censorship of political speech and thought. 
In addition, the borderless nature of the internet makes any kind of regulation of internet 
content and websites through criminal law sanctions both unrealistic and ineffectual 
(Greenberg 2003: 1193). Legal action, though it may appear the most straightforward course 
of action in dealing with offenders, may not be the most effective weapon to counter online 
hate crimes (Perry and Olsson 2009: 196). For starters, litigation faces a number of 
jurisdictional challenges. Since ISPs need not be registered in the states where they 
operate, foreign judgments against them are not always enforced since domestic courts may 
and do often find that the foreign courts lack jurisdiction over the ISP despite the existence of 
offensive material on their site (Yahoo v LICRA 2004: 1120–23).20 Hate sites are sometimes 
located in safe havens, legal jurisdictions that offer them near-absolute freedom from all 
restrictions, thus limiting the efforts of regulatory authorities to control content using legal 
tools at their disposal (Van Blarcum 2009; Banks 2011: 10).  
 
In addition, to jurisdictional challenges, the lack of a concrete definition of hate speech also 
adds to the inadequacy of the law for this issue. Benesch highlights this, pointing out that it is 
difficult ‘to draw the line between speech, which should be sanctioned, and speech that must 
be tolerated in the name of freedom of expression, no matter how ugly it may be,’ (Benesch 
2012: 11). While the courts have determined that certain utterances fall outside the ambit of 
freedom of speech and expression, they have not yet defined what constitutes hate speech 
with clarity. Dealing with hate speech in general and with incitement using digital tools in 
particular is new for Kenya’s law enforcement officers. The ODPP has lost all the cases to 
date that have been taken to Court (Kaberia and Musau 2013). The lack of convictions is 
partly owing to failure to amend the Evidence Act (2012) to allow admission of electronic 
evidence (Kiprono 2017). The lack of rules or guidelines for determining the authenticity of 
electronic evidence in court has also been a challenge. Members of parliament, Moses Kuria 
and Ferdinand Waititu were for instance acquitted in February 2017 following a ruling that 
the video evidence produced was not authentic to warrant their conviction (Daily Nation 
2017). Kuria had, in a public rally, allegedly called for the assassination of opposition leader 
Raila Odinga, saying he was a threat to Kenya. 
 
Moreover, litigation may not always deter offenders from posting online hate. As Banks puts 
it, ‘the periodic episodic prosecution of individual web users is unlikely to deter others from 
                                                 
19  Interview with a key informant, 10 May 2017. 
20  In this case, the US District Court of Appeal in New York held that the decision of the French Court finding liability on 
Yahoo! for containing Nazi memorabilia on their auction website could not be enforced as there was no basis for 
jurisdiction. 
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posting hate speech online’ (Banks 2011). Application of criminal law against individual 
offenders can also be counterproductive. In some cases, criminal prosecution of offenders 
has resulted in the unintended consequences of spreading and publicising the hatred even 
further (Foxman and Wolf 2013). The trial of politicians and personalities for hate speech in 
Kenya has sometimes arguably made them highly popular and in some cases songs have 
even been composed in their support. For example, when eight politicians were arraigned in 
court and remanded for four days in June 2016 for alleged hate speech, they were treated 
as heroes and called ‘Pangani 6’ and ‘Muthaiga 2’ (Mathenge 2016).21 The cases of Muigai 
wa Njoroge, Kamande wa Kioi and John DeMathew, popular Kikuyu musicians, is also 
illustrative. When the musicians were charged with singing songs that border on hate speech 
against former Prime Minister Raila Odinga, many people started buying their music to listen 
to the prohibited music.  
 
This is not to rule out the possibility of legal action against online offenders but to propose 
that litigation must not be treated as the only, or most effective solution for countering hate 
speech and incitement to violence.22 State and non-state actors should nonetheless put in 
place efforts to build the capacity of investigators and prosecutors to deal with cases 
concerning social media and digital technology. To facilitate effective prosecution, there 
should be co-operation between the relevant authorities such as the NCIC, NPS, and ODPP 
as well as non-state actors working on hate speech prevention and online monitoring. 
Legislators should also ensure clarity in laws related to offences occurring online including 
the National Cohesion and Integration Act, Evidence Act and the Penal Code and the 
judiciary trained specifically on these offences and publish rules on the admission of 
electronic evidence. This would be useful to ensure a legal mechanism, which, along with 
other mechanisms, would prove effective tools for regulation of online activity. 
 
An effective regulatory approach would be one that combines legal action with other 
approaches. This paper proposes approaches that would be important to facilitate effective 
regulation. First, the state should embrace self-regulation mechanisms by internet service 
providers (ISPs) as this would be more practical and cost effective than using legal 
mechanisms (Seiber 1998; Walker and Akdeniz 1998). They have the right and responsibility 
to self-regulate what is channelled through their outlets where liability could arise for failure 
to remove material following notice of infringement (DMCA 2000: para g; Stratton Oakmont, 
Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co 1995: 3). In many cases, their intervention simply amounts to 
enforcement of their own Codes of Conduct and/or Terms of Service agreements. Most, if 
not all, online operators have elaborate terms of use which if enforced properly would 
prohibit hate speech and incitement to violence (Yahoo 2017: para 6; Facebook 2017: para 
5; Twitter 2017: para 3). This is effective since ISPs will cooperate with the law to avoid 
liability and to avoid negative publicity which would arise if it was thought that they don’t act 
responsibly (Wall 1999: 6). They respond by blocking or removing hateful content and 
barring users who repeatedly post such content online, once notified by users. The state 
should rely on these mechanisms, in addition to or, as an alternative to legal approaches. 
 
Secondly, the state and non-state actors should encourage co-regulation by internet users. 
Internet users should be viewed as assets since they not only block users who offend them 
but can also report users and material thought to be offensive or illegal. Holding individuals 
responsible for what they post may deter many from using digital platforms to incite others. 
For example, in May 2014 Kenyans complained to Facebook regarding messages Gatundu 
South MP Moses Kuria posted on his account since they incited people to violence and 
                                                 
21  The Pangani 6 are Machakos Senator Johnstone Muthama and MPs Junet Mohamed (Suna East), Timothy Bosire 
(Kitutu Masaba), Moses Kuria (Gatundu South), Kimani Ngunjiri (Bahati), Ferdinand Waititu (Kabete), while Muthaiga 2 
are woman representatives Aisha Jumwa (Kilifi) and Florence Mutua (Busia). 
22  Interview with a key informant, 4 May 2017. 
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fanned ethnic hatred. His account was temporarily suspended.23 Internet intermediaries 
should consider publishing some decisions about specific cases with explanations for the 
decisions made as a way of fostering dialogue on the issue. This would allow for learning 
and understanding of the pertinent issues as well as establishing useful precedents. 
 
Thirdly, counter-speech should be promoted as an effective instrument of dealing with online 
hatred. All stakeholders including internet users should advocate against online hate, 
debunk false information with capacity to incite violence, and counter hateful messages 
posted online. The Umati Study on online hate speech in Kenya found that there was less 
hatred spread through Twitter than Facebook. They attributed this variation to the 
phenomenon they termed as ‘KOT cuffing’, whereby Kenyans on Twitter (KOT) called out 
anyone spreading hate on the platform (Ihub and Ushahidi 2013: 6). This should be 
encouraged by ISPs as well as state and non-state actors. The Bloggers Association of 
Kenya (BAKE) has encouraged such positive use of the social media platforms by giving 
awards to people with informative blogs on a variety of issues including those with credible 
information on political issues. Such efforts should be celebrated as they influence the 
creation of a culture where people care that messages on social media are credible. 
 
Fourth, regulation by code or through technical means would be useful since it would allow 
users to make their own decisions on how to deal with unwanted and harmful content (EU 
Safer Internet Plus Plan 2005). This form of regulation can be achieved by employing 
software, such as firewalls, to filter out sites that are offensive or undesired (Banks 2011: 
11). Rating systems can also be applied to vet content in web documents even before they 
are displayed by the computing device thereby allowing users to choose the content that can 
be accessed over their devices (Akdeniz 2006: 36). These methods should be used 
especially where the sites are registered in safe havens where there are no strict 
requirements for ISPs to remove offensive or illegal content, and where the ISPs consistently 
refuse to respond to legitimate user complaints asking for content to be taken down. 
However, filtering technology should not be adopted by states since this approach could 
unjustifiably restrict users’ rights to freedom of expression thereby constituting a chilling 
effect on free speech (OpenNet Initiative 2009).  
 
Finally, there should be increased efforts to educate and inform internet users. It ought to be 
understood that legal and other sanctions do not impress upon internet users the reasons 
why they should not engage in online hate or incite others to violence but merely punish 
them for doing so. It is important that people are made aware of online hate crime and the 
danger it poses. Public information and education campaigns are therefore an integral part 
of interventions to online hatred. Education increases the responsibility of individual users 
and promotes a culture of intolerance towards online hate speech (Bailey 2006: 56–59). 
State and non-state actors should thus engage in awareness campaigns for internet users 
and reach their audience through both traditional and new media platforms.  
 
The success of any efforts to deal with online hatred, incitement and mobilisation to violence 
is therefore dependent on a collaborative approach that brings a wide array of stakeholders 
including citizens to craft solutions to be enforced. Any intervention must balance the need to 
safeguard freedom of expression with the need to curb the spread of ‘digital violence’ and 
therefore not unreasonably restrict the open nature of the Internet and digital technology. As 
a marketplace of ideas that contributes to development, the internet and social media 
platforms require protection from unnecessary interference and responsible users should be 
guaranteed their rights to privacy and freedom of expression. State and non-state actors 
should work with ISPs to streamline nationwide guidelines on criteria and procedures that 
should be applied to determine whether content is offensive, whilst setting clear processes 
                                                 
23  Moses Kuria was later charged with incitement to violence, hate speech and fanning ethnic hatred but acquitted in April 
2017 for lack of adequate evidence. 
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for such determinations to be made. Taking down of content must be in line with the 
constitutional requirement that a right or fundamental freedom24 shall not be limited except 
by law, and then only to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society. 
 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
The rapid growth and expansion of technology and the emergence of new digital platforms 
and communication forums has presented new challenges to prevent and combat online 
hate speech, incitement and mobilisation to violence during elections. This is largely 
because social media is a double-edged sword, a tool for opening up democracy and 
challenging authoritarian states, whilst calling for accountability and respect of the law. It can 
also be used to support authoritarian regimes in disseminating propaganda (Salanova 2012: 
15–16). As Etling et al. (2010: 3) put it, ‘Internet may be the only avenue left for citizens in 
authoritarian regimes to influence government, fight corruption or defend their rights’.  
 
As this paper discusses, social media on the other hand can be used to rapidly spread 
propaganda, hate speech and incite people to violence (Ihub 2013; Benesch 2014). It 
facilitates the posting of unregulated content to a wide audience and puts no onus on the 
users to verify the content. Comninos (2013) argues that social media can be used to incite 
violence through the circulation of content that serves to offend or elicit a violent reaction 
from an audience group. As seen in the 2007 post-election violence, mobile communication 
may also facilitate organised violence since it enables coordination between those mobilising 
for or countering the violence. Thus, while social media and digital tools can amplify and 
facilitate violence, with improved communication and monitoring, cell phone technology also 
aids, in real time, the distribution of information to security forces and other responders on 
an operational level, helping them to effectively respond to the violence. 
 
The effectiveness of national legislative and judicial efforts to combat online hate speech, 
incitement and mobilisation to violence remains limited, with little success. It is therefore 
important for Kenya’s policymakers to consider other measures that may complement 
whatever limited legislative and judicial mechanisms exist. These include self-regulation, co-
regulation, regulation through code and technical means, information, education and 
awareness campaigns. In all these efforts, however, it is important that the right balance is 
maintained between protecting freedom of expression, as spelt out in the Constitution, and 
combating hate speech, incitement and mobilisation to political violence. 
  
                                                 
24  Freedom of Expression (Article 33) is classified as a fundamental freedom under part two of chapter four of the 
Constitution of Kenya (2010) 
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